Abstract-In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss proposed new kind of cryptographic primitives called proxy reencryption (PRE) and proxy re-signature (PRS) [2] . In proxy re-encryption, a proxy can transform a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened under Bob's decryption key. In proxy re-signature, a proxy can transform a signature computed under Alice's secret key into one that can be verified by Bob's public key. In 2005, Ateniese et al proposed a few new re-encryption schemes and discussed its several potential applications especially in the secure distributed storage [6] . In 2006, they proposed another few proxy re-signature schemes and also discussed its several potential applications [7] . They predicated that proxy re-encryption and proxy re-signature will play an important role in our life. Since then, researchers are sparked to give new lights to this area. Many excellent schemes have been proposed. In this paper, we introduce a new attack-DDos attack against proxy in the proxy recryptography. Although this attack can also be implemented against other cryptographic primitives, the danger caused by it in proxy re-cryptography seems more serious. We revisit the current literature, paying attention on their resisting DDos attack ability. We suggest a solution to decline the impact of DDos attacking. Also we give a new efficient reencryption scheme which can achieve CCA2 secure based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and prove its security. We point out this is the most efficient proxy re-encryption schemes for the proxy which can achieve CCA2 secure in the literature. At last we give our conclusions with hoping researchers give more attention on this attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proxy re-cryptography dates back to the work of Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss in 1998. The goal of proxy re-encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties.Simirlarly, the goal of proxy re-signature is to securely enable the signature signed by one to transform to be another signature on the same message signed by another without relying on trusted parties.In 2005, Ateniese et al proposed a few new re-encryption schemes and discussed its several potential applications especially in the secure distributed storage [6] . In 2006, they proposed another few proxy resignature schemes and also discussed its several potential
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applications [7] . They predicated that proxy re-encryption and proxy re-signature will play an important role in our life. Since then, researchers are sparked to give new lights to this area.Many excellent schemes have been proposed,especially,the IEEE P1363.3 standard working group is establishing the standard for proxy re-encryption, which will certainly give new power on researching in recryptography.
Generally speaking, we can split the research area into two parts-proxy re-encryption part and proxy resignature part.In proxy re-encryption area, besides the pioneering work [2] , [6] , researchers have done some good work on achieving CCA2 proxy re-encryption such as [11] , [22] ,some good work on achieving proxy reencryption in identity-based settings [14] or between identity-based setting and PKI setting [9] , [15] ,some good work on achieving proxy re-encryption without random oracle [16] , [17] ,some good work on other aspects of proxy re-encryption [12] , [18] - [21] , [23] , [24] .In proxy re-signature area,some good work also has been done [7] , [13] , [26] , [27] .
Motivation. Undoubtedly security is the most important thing when we consider on re-cryptography, but we can not ignore the practice of this new cryptographic primitive either. But in the current literature, very little attention has been paid on efficiency, especially on the efficiency of proxy. Because in most circumstances the semi-trusted proxies are relative scarce equipments,we are certain that they are easily suffering from the DDos attacking, especially when the proxy must implement lots of computation. We can find the proof in the [6] :
Our server is able to sustain 100 reencryptions/sec until reaching about 1,000 outstanding requests. The server coped with up to 10,000 outstanding re-encryption requests, but quickly spiraled downwards thereafter.
So we must count the DDos attack in re-cryptography, at least decrease the dangerous caused by this attack. Our Contribution. In this paper, we pay attention to the efficiency of the proxy. The workload of proxy can be divided into two parts: one part for checking the initialsignature or initial-ciphertext validity and the other part for proxy re-encryption or proxy re-signature. Most of existing schemes relying on bilinear pairings, which can be used to construct many interesting protocols [28] . We revisit the literature on proxy re-encryption and proxy resignature, especially pay attention on their ability of resisting DDos attacking, we propose a solution to decrease the dangerous of DDos attack on proxy, Also we give a new efficient proxy re-encryption scheme which can achieve CCA2 secure based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and prove its security. We point out this is the most efficient proxy re-encryption schemes for the proxy which can achieve CCA2 secure in the literature.
We organize our paper as following:In section 2,we revisit the current literature on proxy reencryption,especially on the efficiency of proxy, and give some comparisons to the existing schemes; In section 3, we revisit the current literature on proxy resignature,especially on the efficiency of proxy,and also give some comparisons to the existing schemes; In section 4,we propose a solution to decrease the dangerous caused by DDos attack;In section 5, we give a new efficient proxy re-encryption scheme which can achieve CCA2 secure based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and prove its security;In section 6, we give our concluding remarks.
II. REVISIT PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
In this section, we revisit most known proxy reencryption schemes in the literature, including traditional public key encryption environment , identity-based proxy re-encryption environment and hybrid encryption environment.
A. Proxy Re-encryption in Public Key Certificates Setting 1) [AFGH05 Scheme]: This Elgamal based scheme operates on bilinear parings in group G 1 , G 2 , G T .
1) Key Generation (KG):
A user A's key pair is of the form pk a = (z a1 , g a 2 ), sk a = (a 1 , a 2 ). 2) Re-Encryption Key Generation (RG): A user A delegates to B by publishing the re-encryption key rk AB = g a1b2 ∈ G 1 , computed from B's public key.
3) First-Level Encryption (E 1 ): To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 under pk a in such a way that it can only be decrypted by the holder of sk a , output
To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 under pk a in such a way that it can be decrypted by A and her delegatees, output c a,r = (g k , mZ a1k ). 5) Re-Encryption (R): Any one can change a secondlevel ciphertext for A into a first-level ciphertext for
phertext c a = (α, β) with secret key sk = a, compute m = β/α 1/a . To decrypt a second-level ciphertext c a = (α, β) with secret key sk = a, compute m = β/e(α, g) 1/a .
In this scheme the delegation key need not be private. The scheme does not require initial ciphertext checking, but the proxy needs one pairing to do the reencryption.This scheme has the property of containing two-level ciphertexts, some additional computation must be operated to distinguish the first level and second level.This scheme is not CCA2 secure.
we conclude this section with Table 1 , which shows the efficiency of the proxy and the schemes' ability of resisting DDos attack in public key certificate setting(Description of some schemes list in the appendix).
B. Proxy Re-encryption in Identity Based Setting 1) [M07b Scheme]: There are five entities involved in an identity-based proxy re-encryption system, delegator, proxy, delegatee, PKG and Re-encryption Key Generator, RKG.In this system, each of delegator and delegatee is an IBE user. The RKG generates re-encryption keys and sets them into the proxy via secure channel.
• The underlying IBE system (BB-IBE system): 1) SetUp IBE (k).Given a security parameter k, select a random generator g ∈ G and random elements g 2 , h ∈ G. Pick a random α ∈ Z * p . Set g 1 = g,mk = g α 2 , and parms = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h). Let mk be the master-secret key and let parms be the public parameters. 2) KeyGen IBE (mk, parms, ID). Given mk = g α 2 and ID with parms, pick a random
To encrypt a message M ∈ G 1 under the public key ID ∈ Z * p , pick a random r ∈ Z * p and compute
• The delegation system:
2) KeyGen RKG (mk, parms). Given mk = with parms , set sk R = . 3) KeyGen P RO (sk R , e ID , parms, ID, ID ).
Given sk R = α, e ID = g u with parms, set
Given the delegator's identity ID, the delegatee's identity ID , rk ID→ID = (ID → ID , g u α ),C ID = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) with parms, re-encrypt the ciphertext C ID into C ID as follows. 
CPA
No No 3pairing Remark 1: * This scheme is designed for tracing the malicious proxy.** This is a RSA-TBOS signcryption with proxy re-encryption scheme.@ This scheme is a group based proxy re-encryption scheme and we think it is CPA secure although the authors claimed it to be CCA2 secure.@@ This scheme is a group based proxy re-encryption scheme and we think it is CPA secure although the authors claimed it to be CCA2 secure. Our scheme can be seen in section 5,which is the most efficient among the CCA2 secure schemes. In this scheme, the proxy key needs not be private,checking the initial ciphertext needs two pairing computation and re-encryption needs one pairing computation. This scheme is CPA secure.
The hybrid proxy re-encryption system involving the ElGamal-type CBE system and the BB-IBE system.
• The underlying IBE system (BB-IBE system):
1) SetUp IBE (k).Given a security parameter k, select a random generator g ∈ G and random elements g 2 , h ∈ G. Pick a random α ∈ Z * p . Set g 1 = g,mk = g α 2 , and parms = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h). Let mk be the master-secret key and let parms be the public parameters. 2) KeyGen IBE (mk, parms, ID). Given mk = g α 2 and ID with parms, pick a random
• The underlying CBE system (ElGamal-type CBE system): 1) KeyGen CBE (k, parms). Given a security parameter k and parms, pick a random β, θ, δ ∈ Z p . Set g 3 = g θ ,g 4 = g β 1 and g 5 = h δ . The public key is pk = (g 3 , g 4 , g 5 ). The secret random key is sk = (β, θ, δ).
2) Enc CBE (pk, parms, M).
Given pk = (g 3 , g 4 , g 5 ) and a message M with parms, pick a random r ∈ Z * p and compute
, the re-encryption key rk ID = (β, g u/θ , δ) and ID with parms, re-encrypt the ciphertext CPKinto CIDas follows.
In this scheme, the proxy key need be private, checking the initial ciphertext requires four pairing computation and re-encryption requires three exponentiation and one pairing computation.This scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure and is being standardized by IEEEP1363.3 workgroup.
we conclude the above two sections with Table 2 , which shows the efficiency of the proxy and the schemes' ability of resisting DDos attack in identity based setting(Description of some schemes list in the appendix).
III. REVISIT PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEMES 2) [AH06a Scheme]:
This scheme based on the BLS short signature scheme.It requires a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 operates over two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q. The global parameters are (e, q, G 1 , G 2 , g, H), where g generates G 1 and H is a hash function from arbitrary strings to elements in G 1 .
1) KeyGeneration(KeyGen): On input the security parameter 1 k , select a random a ∈ Z q , and On input two secret keys sk A = a, sk B = b (the public keys are not required for this algorithm), output the resignature key rk A→B = b/a(modq). 3) Sign(Sign): On input a secret key sk = a and a message m, output δ = H(m) a . 4) Re − Sign(ReSign):On input a re-signature key rk A→B , a public key pk A , a signature δ, and a message m, check that V erif y(pk A , m, δ) = 1. If δ does not verify, output ⊥; otherwise, output δ = δ rk A→B . 5) Verify(Verify): On input a public key pk A , a message m, and a purported signature δ, output 1 if e(δ, g) = e(H(m), pk A ) and 0 otherwise. In this scheme, the proxy key needs to be private, checking the initial signature requires one verifying ,that is , two pairing computation. Re-signature requires one exponentiation computation.This scheme is EU-CMA secure.
we conclude this sections with Table 3 , which shows the efficiency of the proxy and the signature schemes' ability of resisting DDos attack.
IV. A SOLUTION TO DECREASE THE DANGER CAUSED BY DDOS ATTACK
Generally speaking,the workload of proxy can be divided into two parts, one part for the ciphertext or signature validity checking, one part for the re-encrypting or resigning.We note that the validity checking can be done without any secret, but the re-encrypting or re-signing needs some secret to be done or at least needs to be done at some semi-trusted nodes. So we can separate the workload of the proxy into two parts. We introduce some aided proxies in the system, which can be some equipments having lots of computation power.But we do not plant any private value in it,all we need is these equipments can be trusted to honestly do the checking work.Furthermore, we denotes the original proxies as main proxies, which also must be powerful. It must do all the work of re-encryption or re-signature, and it must answer the re-encrypt or re-sign Oracle's queries.
We also note the proxy re-encryption and proxy resignature schemes can be divided by two kinds -one kind Figure 4 . A distribution of multi-proxies in proxy re-encryption or proxy re-signature setting of proxy key must be private and the other need not -by the proxy key being private or not.In the case of proxy key being public, the difference between main proxies and aided proxies can be disappeared, that is to say, all the proxies run in the peer to peer model. In the case of proxy key being private, only the main proxies can do the reencryption or re-signature work. We express our idea in Firgure 1. In the firgure, the white nodes denote the end user;the small black nodes denote the aided proxy which only do the checking work;the big black node denotes the main proxy which do the checking and re-encryption or re-signature work; the thin black arrows denote the communication from the end user to the aided proxy or main proxy;the big red arrows denote the communication from the aided proxy to the main proxy which happens only after the initial ciphertext or signature passing the checking. But we note that DDos attacking can not be avoided, all we can do is just decreasing the damage caused by it. So we remark our solution just tries best to 
This scheme is a bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme. ** This scheme is uni-directional single-use scheme with public re-signature key. *** This scheme is uni-directional single-use scheme with private re-signature key. @ This scheme is a multi-use bidirectional scheme. @@ This scheme is an ID based multi-use bidirectional scheme. This scheme is a single-hop scheme. This means the forwarding computation is for level 1 signature and the latter computation is for level 2 signature. This scheme is a multi-hop scheme. The scheme assume a group G of prime order q, where q is large. It also assume that cleartext messages are (or can be encoded as) elements of G. It also use a universal one-way family of hash functions that map long bit strings to elements of Z q . 1) KeyGeneration. The key generation algorithm runs as follows. Random elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G are chosen, and random elements x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z q are also chosen. Next, the group elements c = g
are computed. Next, a hash function H is chosen from the family of universal one-way hash functions. The public key is (g 1 , g 2 , c, d, h, H) , and the private key is (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z). 2) Encryption. Given a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm runs as follows. First, it chooses r ∈ Z q at random. Then it computes
the decryption algorithm runs as follows. It first computes α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e), and tests if u (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) ; The delegatee's public key is pk B = (g 1 , g 2 , c , d , h , H),his private key is sk B = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ).
1) Re − KeyGeneration(ReKeyGen)
On input sk A = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) , sk B = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ),output the re-signature key rk A→B = (kx 1 , kx 2 , ky 1 , ky 2 , k x 1 , k x 2 , k y 1 , k y 2 , z/z ) where k, k ∈ Z * q .The delegator preserves k for ciphertexttransformation purpose and the delegatee preserves k for decryption purpose. 2) Encryption. Given a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm runs as follows. First, it chooses r ∈ Z q at random. Then it computes u 1 = g
On input initial ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v), the delegator transforms it to be (u 1 , u 2 , e, v ) where
Given a reencryption ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e , v ), the decryption algorithm runs as follows. It first computes α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e ), and tests
If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e /(u 1 ) z . 6) Decryption 2 (Dec 2 ). Given a normal ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v), the decryption algorithm runs as follows. It first computes α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e), and tests if (u 1 ) (x1+y1α) (u 2 ) (x2+y2α) = v. If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e/(u 1 )
z .
First we show our re-encryption ciphertext is a valid Cramer-Shoup ciphertext.
Next we note that,in our scheme, the delegator must preserve k,it has the Ciphertext-transformation algorithm which operated by delegator by k,and the delegatee must preserve k for validating the re-encryption ciphertext. Everything we do like that is just for CCA2 security, which we will explain in the next section.And we believe that ciphertext-transformation algorithm is a reasonable step for re-encryption, after all, re-encryption is possible only after the delegator agrees this.The additional cost is that delegator and delegatee must preserve k and k for every re-key generation.This is a shortcoming which we hope it can be improved in the future. At last, we compare our scheme with other CCA2 secure scheme.First, the proxy key in our scheme must be private, the initial ciphertext checking requires two exponentiation computation and the re-encryption requires six exponentiation computation.Because our scheme needs no pairing(one pairing almost equals six exponentiation), so our scheme's proxy is most efficient so far, which can be seen in Table 4 .
B. Security Analysis
First we give our security model for our new proxy reencryption scheme,we follow the models in [7] , [11] .Then we prove our scheme in this model. Definition 1: (Bidirectional PRE-CCA game) Let k be the security parameter. Let A be an oracleT M , representing the adversary. The game consists of an execution of A with the following oracles, which can be invoked multiple times in any order, subject to the constraints below:
• Uncorrupted keygeneration O keygen : Obtain a new key pair as (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 k ). A is given pk .
• Corrupted key generationO corkeygen : Obtain a new key pair as (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 k ).A is given pk , sk.
• Re-encryption key generation O rekeygen :On input (pk, pk ) by the adversary, where pk, pk were generated before by KeyGen, return the re-encryption key rk pk↔pk = ReKeyGen(sk, sk ) where sk , sk are the secret keys that correspond to pk, pk . We require that either both pk and pk are corrupted, or alternatively both are uncorrupted. We do not allow for re-encryption key generation queries between a corrupted and an un-corrupted key. (This represents the restriction that the identities of parties whose security is compromised should be fixed in advance.) • Encryptionoracle. Given a message m ∈ G,the output ciphertext is (u 1 , u 2 , e, v).
• Ciphertext-transformation oracle O ctra : On input ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v), the delegator transforms it to be (u 1 , u 2 , e, v ) where v = v k .
• Challenge oracle:This oracle can be queried only once. On input (pk * , m 0 , m 1 ), where pk * is called the challenge key, the oracle chooses a bit b ← {0, 1}and returns the challenge ciphertext C * = Enc(pk * , m b ). (As we note later, the challenge key must be uncorrupted for A to win).
• Re-encryption O renc : On input (pk, pk , C), where pk,pk were generated before by KeyGen, if pk is corrupted, then return a special symbol ⊥ which is not in the domains of messages or ciphertexts. Else, return the re-encrypted ciphertext C = ReEnc(ReKeyGen(sk, sk ), C).
• Decryption oracle O dec1 : On input a re-encryption ciphertext (pk, C), if pk was not generated before by KeyGen, then return a special symbol ⊥ which is not in the domain D of messages. Else, return Dec 1 (sk, C).
• Decryption oracle O dec2 : On input a normal ciphertext (pk, C), if pk was not generated before by KeyGen, then return a special symbol ⊥ which is not in the domain D of messages. Else, return Dec 2 (sk, C).
• Decision oracle: This oracle can also be queried only once. On input b : If b = b and the challenge key pk * is not corrupted, then output 1; else output 0.
We say that A wins the P RE − CCA game with advantage if the probability, over the random choices of A and the oracles, that the decision oracle is invoked and outputs 1, is at least 1/2 + .
Internal and External Security. Our security model protects users from two types of attacks: those launched from parties outside the system (External Security), and those launched from parties inside the system, such as the proxy, another delegation partner, or some collusion between them (Internal Security). We now provide both intuition and a formalization of these security notions. External Security:Our first security notion protects a user from adversaries outside the system (i.e., excluding the proxy and any delegation partners).
Definition 2:
A PRE scheme is chosen-ciphertext se-cure if the probability
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. In our notation, St is a state information maintained by A while (pk, sk) is the target user's key pair generated by the challenger that also chooses other keys for corrupt and honest parties. For other honest parties, keys are subscripted by h or h'and we subscript corrupt keys by x or x'. The adversary is given access to all re-encryption keys but those that would allow re-encrypting from the target user to a corrupt one. In the game, A is said to have advantage if this probability, taken over random choices of A and all oracles, is at least 1/2 + . Internal Security:Our second security notion protects a user, as much as possible, when they are fooled into trusting a rogue proxy and/or delegation partner (who may be colluding).
• Limited Proxy: If the delegator and the delegatee are both honest, then the proxy cannot decrypt the ciphertext or not even distinguish two ciphertexts. We will show our scheme is CPA secure for the proxy.
• Delegatee Security: Because in our scheme, the proxy key is private, then If the delegator and proxy collude, the delegatee is no longer safe.
• Delegator Security: As the same reason above,the delegator is no longer safe as the delegator and proxy collude in our scheme. After we set the model for our scheme , we prove our scheme's security.We give two theorems as following:
Theorem 1: Our proxy re-encryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen cipher-text attack for the external adversaries assuming that (1) the hash function H is chosen from a universal one-way family, and (2) the DiffeHellman decision problem is hard in the group G. Proof.The intuition is that the initial ciphertext is a Cramer-Shoup ciphertext,nobody can get help from the re-encryption oracle by querying the oracle with "invalid ciphertext".Also our re-encryption ciphertext is a Cramer-Shoup ciphertext, nobody can get help either.The proxy key in our scheme is of the form rk A→B = (kx 1 , kx 2 , ky 1 , ky 2 , k x 1 , k x 2 , k y 1 , k y 2 , z/z ),any external adversary can not distinguish it with sk A = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) , sk B = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ), thus the adversary can not get any help information from reKeygeneration Oracle.
We give our scheme's formal proof as following.Assume the external adversaries' algorithm B breaking the IND-CCA2 property of the scheme ,we use B to construct algorithm A distinguish a four tuple (g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) from G is a DDH tuple or not. Oralce queries from B are handled by A as following:
• Query to Key Generation Oracle: If user i is corrupted ,A randomly chooses sk i = (x 1i , x 2i , y 1i , y 2i , z i ) ∈ Z q at random,also chooses a hash function H at random and computes
,return pk i and sk i to the adversary. If the user j is uncorrupted, A randomly chooses sk j = (x 1j , x 2j , y 1j , y 2j , z 1j , z 2j ) ∈ Z q at random, also chooses a hash function H at random and computes
2 , H),returns pk j to the adversary.That is ,there is a KeGen list of form(corrupted, i, sk i = (x 1i , x 2i , y 1i , y 2i , z i ),
H).
• Query to Re-Keygeneration Oracle:On input (i, j) to O rekeygen , if one of i and j is uncorrupted and the other is corrupted, then this call is illegal(So we just consider uncorrupted users in re-keygeneration , ciphertext-transformation , re-encryption and decryption oracle queries). Otherwise, A randomly choose k i , k j , z ∈ Z * q and outputs the re-encryption key
That is ,there is a ReEnc KeyGen list of form (uncorrupted, i, k i , uncorrupted, j, k j , z) • Query to Encryption Oracle:. Given a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm runs as follows. First, it chooses r ∈ Z q at random.
v).
• Query to Ciphertext-Transformation Oracle:On input (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) from user i to user j,if user i and j are uncorrupted, B search in the ReEncKeyGen list and if finding an item including i and j,then compute v = v ki ,and outputs (u 1 , u 2 , e, v ), else first run the querying to Re-Keygeneration Oracle.
• Query to the Re-encryption Oracle:On input(u 1 , u 2 , e, v ) from user i to user j, search the ReEncKeyGen list and if finding an item including i and j,then B first verifies ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v )'s validity. if u = v. If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e/u z1 1 u z2 2 , if finding an item including j and corrupted, run dec 2 (sk j , c). Else first run qurey to Key Generation Oracle. Next we show our oracle simulation is perfect.
• Key Generation Oracle Simulation:For corrupted users, the simulated output 
H) also is an identical distribution to the real distribution of real private key and public key for
So this is a perfect simulation.
• Re-Keygeneration Oracle Simulation: When user i query the oracle with input i, j and users i or j is corrupted, we call this query illegal and output ⊥.If users i and j are uncorrupted, the simulated output is
which is indistinguishable with rk A→B = (kx 1 , kx 2 , ky 1 , ky 2 , k x 1 , k x 2 , k y 1 , k y 2 , z/z ).So this is also a perfect simulation.
• Encryption Oracle Simulation:.In the real encryption,Given a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm runs as follows. First, it chooses r ∈ Z q at random. Then it computes u 1 = g
this is also a perfect simulation.
• Decryptionlevel 2 Oracle Simulation:In the real Decryption Dec 2 ,a normal ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v), the decryption algorithm runs as follows. It first computes α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e), and tests if (u 1 ) (x1+y1α) (u 2 ) (x2+y2α) = v. If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e/(u 1 )
z .In our simulation,On input c = (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) to user j, B first computes α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e), and search the KeyGen list if finding an item including j and uncorrupted then tests if u (g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) is a DDH tuple.Our simulated decryption is a perfect decryption.In lemma l, we will show anybody cannot construct valid (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) by himself with (g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) being not a DDH tuple.Thus ,anybody can not distinguish the real decryption and the simulated decryption.So this is also a perfect simulation. Lemma 1: If (g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) is not a DDH tuple, the decryption oracle(includes dec 1 ,dec 2 ,Decryptionlevel 1 Oracle and Decryptionlevel 2 Oracle) will reject all invalid ciphertexts, except with negligible probability. Proof.The proof of this lemma is same as [1] ,the only difference is that in the dec 1 and Decryptionlevel 1 Oracle simulation, the adversary must solve the first three equations x 1 + wx 2 = log c g1 mod q y 1 + wy 2 = log d g1 mod q kr 1 x 1 + kr 1 αy 1 + kwr 2 x 2 + kwr 2 αy 2 = log V g1 mod q x 1 + wx 2 = log c g1 mod q y 1 + wy 2 = log d g1 mod q r 1 x 1 + r 1 αy 1 + wr 2 x 2 + wr 2 αy 2 = log V g1 mod q while in the dec 1 and Decryptionlevel 1 Oracle simulation, the adversary must solve the latter three equations The above two equations are all have q solvations, thus the adversary can guess the right v is negligible.For full proof readers may refereed [1] .
Thus, our simulation is perfect for the external adversary, if A can break our proxy re-encryption scheme, B can solve the DDH problem in G.Thus we prove our theorem.
Theorem 2: Our proxy re-encryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen plaintext attack for the proxy assuming that the DL problem is hard in the group G. Proof.For the proxy, our scheme just like a Elgamal proxy re-encryption scheme proposed by [2] .We know that scheme is CPA secure, so our scheme is CPA secure for the proxy.
C. Efficiency
We compare our scheme's efficiency with other CCA2 proxy re-encryption schemes in table 4. We know from [10] that one pairing almost equals six exponentiation, so our scheme is the most efficiency until now which can achieve CCA2 secure.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper, we introduce a new attack-DDos attack against proxy in the proxy re-cryptography. Although this attack can also be implemented against other cryptographic primitives, the danger caused by it in proxy recryptography seems more serious. We revisit the current literature, paying attention on their resisting DDos attack ability. We suggest a solution to decline the impact of DDos attacking. Also we give a new efficient proxy re-encryption scheme which can achieve CCA2 secure based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and prove its security. We point out this is the most efficient proxy re-encryption schemes for the proxy which can achieve CCA2 secure in the literature until now.But we also note that our scheme is a bidirectional scheme with private re-encryption key, which maybe restrict its application. Finding a unidirectional re-encryption scheme with public re-encryption key and other good properties defined in [6] is still an open problem. : * This is a RSA-TBOS signcryption with proxy re-encryption scheme,but this scheme have not the process checking inital ciphertext,any one can construct invalid ciphertext for DDos attacking,so it is not efficient for resisting DDos attacking. Figure 5 . Efficiency comparison between our scheme and other CCA2 secure schemes
